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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
administrative regulation than criminal prosecutions, right to counsel
appears inappropriate. In the principal case, facing no controlling
authority, the court should have balanced these conflicting interests
before extending right to counsel to misdemeanants.
COMPENSATION FOR CONDEMNATION OF LAND
ENHANCED IN VALUE BY AGRICULTURAL ALLOTMENT
Defendant's farm, including 550 acres devoted to production of
cotton under an acreage allotment from the Department of Agriculture,
was condemned by the federal government for an irrigation project.
Defendant retained the right under section 1378 (a) of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act' to transfer its cotton quota to other property under its
ownership, and did so. Trial before a jury resulted in an award to
defendant based on the value of its property as a cotton farm, less the
value of the section 1378 right retained.2 The government objected on
the ground that the enhanced value to the land resulting from the
cotton allotment was not compensable when the owner utilized his
right to reestablish the allotment on other land. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Enhancement in land value
resulting from a cotton allotment, reduced by the value of the section
1378 right retained, must be included in determining compensation for
'The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 § 378(a), added by 72 Stat. 995 (1958),
as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1378(a) (1965), provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the allotment determined
for any commodity for any land from which the owner is displaced because of
acquistion of the land for any purpose, other than for the continued production
of alloted crops, by any Federal, State, or other agency having the right of
eminent domain shall be placed in an allotment pool and shall be available only
for use in providing allotments for other farms owned by the owner so displaced.
Upon application to the county committee, within three years after the date of
such displacement. .. any owner so displaced shall be entitled to have established
for other farms owned by him allotments which are comparable with allotments
determined for other farms in the same area which are similar except for the past
acreage of the commodity....
Commodities, the allotments for which are subject to the section 1378 right, are
corn, wheat, rice, peanuts, tobacco, and cotton.
- Defendant's witnesses set a valuation of $1,050,000 for the land with the allot-
ment attached. The government's experts assigned a value of $865,000, of which
$413,000 was enhancement by virtue of the allotment and $452,000 was the value of
the land alone. 350 F.2d at 685.
The portion of the trial court's instruction relating to the proper method for the
jury to arrive at a valuation was, 350 F.2d at 685 n.2:
It is my advice that the most reasonable approach to a solution of this problem is
for you first to agree upon the fair market value of Citrus Valley Farm on July 1,
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property condemned. United States v. Citrus Valley Farms, Inc., 350
F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1965).
Broadly speaking, compensation awarded to a condemnee is mea-
sured by the fair market value of the property, as it exists at the time
the property is taken.3 The most advantageous use to which the prop-
erty may be devoted is considered in arriving at the valuation.4 How-
ever, when the most advantageous use is the result of governmental
policy, there is disagreement whether this increment of value may be
awarded to the property owner. Recent decisions have held that
enhancement resulting from a general governmental policy should be
included in a condemnation award,' but no previous case has dealt
with the precise question of the proper valuation of enhancement in
property value when a section 1378 right was involved.
The court in the principal case rejected the government's contention
that an allotment is a revocable "government-bestowed right" which
enhances in a constant amount any lands to which it is attached, and
pointed out that each allotment affords the basis for a history of cotton
production on its associated tract of land. This productive history
represents, in turn, a proven record of worth for the production of
cotton. After condemnation, the court reasoned, what is left in the
farmer's hands by virtue of section 1378 is only a license-to-produce,
which proves nothing about the value of new land as a cotton-produc-
ing unit. The court concluded that the difference in value between the
allotment as an element in the original farm's worth, and as a section
1378 right separate from the land, was taken by the government and
therefore compensable.
1959, as if it were then being sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer, both of
whom had all the information affecting the value of the property which you now
have. Having determined such fair market value, you then should consider and
agree upon the monetary value, if any, established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, of the Section 1378 right retained by the defendant, and subtract such value
from the fair market value of defendant's property. The difference should be the
amount of your award as just compensation to the defendant.
The jury found that the land and allotment were worth $1,024,000 together, that the
section 1378 right was valueless, and that the owner was entitled to the full $1,024,000
as compensation.3 See 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.5 (rev. 3d ed. 1965).
'Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ; 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note
3, § 12.314; 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 30 (2d ed. 1953).
'United States v. Douglas, 207 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1953) (enhancement from a
regional irrigation development included, even though water was not yet available
when the land was condemned); United States v. Jaranillo, 190 F.2d 300 (10th
Cir. 1951); Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1946). Enhancement
from general governmental policy should be distinguished from enhancement which
is the result of the special project for which the land is to be taken. Increase in
value of the latter sort is not properly part of an award. See United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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Underlying the court's reasoning is the implicit assumption that
impact of a general governmental policy is a proper part of an award.6
If the enhanced value is such that a private buyer would be willing to
pay for it, the government should also pay. For example, a revocable
cattle-grazing permit on United States Forest Service lands is but a
government-bestowed privilege; its value is non-compensable if the
land upon which the permit has been granted is taken by another
department of the government for other purposes.' Nevertheless, it
has been held that the increment in value resulting from such a permit
on Forest Service land adjacent to a condemned ranch should be con-
sidered in determining an award for the ranch, so long as the permit
continued to exist at the time the ranch was condemned.' By analogy,
the land owner in the principal case would have received full compen-
sation for the land, valued as a cotton farm, were no section 1378 right
involved, since the allotment was not cancelled prior to condemnation.
The key issue in the principal case was whether the allotment
attached to the original land, and the right to reestablish it elsewhere,
are one and the same. The government assumed, and the district court
in a pre-trial memorandum agreed, that they were the same. Accord-
ing to this reasoning, an allotment has a certain constant value, which,
when the allotment is moved, would enhance new land by precisely the
same amount as it had the old.' ° Thus, argued the government, to
pay anything for the allotment would unjustly enrich the defendant
by placing him in a better position than he was before the taking. The
court in the principal case correctly distinguished the right from the
allotment. In characterizing an allotment as a "measure of the proven
'The court did not cite any authority upholding the proposition. See note
5 supra.
" Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944).
'United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951). See also United
States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1951).
'A pretrial conference was held before the district court to determine how the
cotton allotment should be treated. The court was of the opinion that:
[T]he cotton allotment on Citrus Valley Farms was not condemned by the
Government, and just compensation for the land taken should not include any
enhancement by reason of the allotment. The condemned land should be valued
as agricultural land, suitable for the production of cotton, but without a cotton
allotment. United States v. 3,296.82 Acres of Land, 222 F. Supp. 173, 175
(D. Ariz. 1963).
At subsequent pretrial conferences before a different judge, who subsequently
presided over the trial, the court reversed its earlier position in favor of that
taken at the trial. Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
" One commentator has concluded that the enhancement resulting from a cotton
allotment is not a constant figure. Its value may range from zero in central
Georgia to $1000 in California. Westfall, Agricultural Allotments As Property,
79 HARv. L. REv. 1180, 1196 (1966). The value of an allotment may further depend
upon the individual characteristics of the land. See note 11 infra.
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productive value" of the land to which it has been attached, and as
more than a government-granted license, the court indicated that the
history of production under an allotment shows the land's cotton-
producing quality. If land with an allotment were sold to a private
buyer, the production record would itself be an important considera-
tion in setting the purchase price." Even if the license aspect of an
allotment were withdrawn by congressional repeal of the allotment
program, the record of production gained under an allotment would
still constitute irrefutable proof of a tract's special value for cotton
production.
The transfer of an allotment to other acreage is an economic gamble
because there is normally no prior record of such land's cotton-produc-
ing quality. The allotment attached to new land becomes only a license
to plant cotton, without any assurance of financial success, and, until
the new land's capacity is known, there is no assurance that its cotton
production will be equal to that of the land from which the allotment
was moved. The "right" is, therefore, potentially less valuable than
the allotment,'2 and any difference in value represents a capital asset
taken by the government when it condemned the former land.
Unfortunately, the court in the principal case failed to set forth a
workable standard for valuation of the section 1378 right. The factors
relied upon by the court to establish a fair market value of the right
as of the time the original farm was condemned did not accurately
reflect its actual value.' 3 Because the right is an anomalous species of
' It seems obvious that a production record of two bales of cotton per acre
would increase the value of one piece of land over that of another with a production
record of 1.5 bales.
"-'Examination of the statute reveals a number of other limitations on the right.
It is personal, limited in duration, and not subject to transfer. See Morrow v.
Clayton, 326 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1963) (right subject to forfeiture for making
secret arrangements to allow another to use it). The individual can exercise it
only to the extent that the ratio of cotton acreage to total irrigated acreage on his
new farm does not exceed the average ratio for the entire county in which the new
farm is located. This is implicit in 7 C.F.R. § 719.11(f) (5) (1965). This provision
eliminates use of the right by a farmer who buys a farm with an existing ratio equal
to, or in excess of, the county average.
There is also the possibility that the right may prove to be more valuable than
the allotment. There is nothing in the statute, for example, which would prevent
the condemnee of a farm in Georgia from reestablishing his allotment on a new
farm in California. The new tract might prove to have greater productive capacity
than the old, so that the enhancement to the former would be greater than to the
latter.
" The factors which the court enumerated included testimony as to the cost and
availability, within a large surrounding area, both of farm land suitable for cotton pro-
duction, but currently without an allotment, and of raw desert land. Testimony as to
the general cost of developing the land tended to obscure the major issue of the worth
of the particular 1378 right to the defendant.
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"property," and, moreover, because the right is not salable, 4 it is
incorrect even to speak of its "fair market value."'
15
Since the value of the right depends ultimately upon the productive
quality of the individual replacement tract which is chosen by the con-
demnee, a method of valuation more appropriate than that approved
by the court might be to consider, in retrospect, how much the right
actually benefitted its owner." Two situations are distinguishable
when dealing with this formula. First, when a condemnee does not
wish to exercise his right, either because of having purchased land
with a pre-existing allotment or because of retiring from the business
of cotton growing, nothing should be deducted from the value of his
land and allotment. Neither the language of the statute nor its legis-
lative history suggests that the right was intended as more than an
option, available when suitable replacement lands with allotments
already attached could not be reasonably had. 7 To deduct the value
of the right as of the date of taking, without regard to whether the
landowner planned to use it, would place those who did not exercise
the option in poorer financial postion than before their land was taken.
A court should allow the owner to renounce his right and recover the
full compensation. Second, when the right to transfer the allotment
to other land has been utilized before trial, it would seem proper to
inquire to what extent the allotment on the new land has actually
enhanced the new land's value. The amount of enhancement resulting
from the transfer affords a definitive method of valuing what the owner
did, in fact, realize from the right to transfer his allotment. This
method offers the additional advantage that the enhancement may be
objectively valued by means of whatever productive history is estab-
14Congress has recently amended the Agricultural Adjustment Act to provide
for the sale or lease of cotton allotments, subject to quite restrictive conditions,
separately from any land. 79 Stat. 1197, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1344(b) (Supp. 1965). Section
1344(b) will apparently have little effect on section 1378, since the section 1378
right, itself, remains personal and non-salable.
'Asked about the value of the section 1378 right, one expert witness admitted:
"I don't know how you would value 1378 as such." Brief for Appellee, p.6.
"o There would appear to be no rule of evidence which would prohibit a court
from taking such a retrospective view. "In order to obtain substantial justice in
eminent domain proceedings it is necessary for courts to adopt working rules to
fit the particulars of the case." United States v. Silver Queen Mining Co., 285
F.2d 506, 509-10 (10th Cir. 1960).
1 The forerunner of section 1378 was passed to eliminate the shortage of tobacco
allotments created by widespread condemnation of rural areas in the South for
military bases at the start of World War II. In one county alone, over 40,000 acres
of tobacco land and allotments were taken. Remaining lands with allotments were
not sufficient to accomodate all the displaced farmers. "The farmers who know how
to grow tobacco must have other tobacco land. It will not be helpful that the lands
can be secured unless tobacco acreage allotments are provided for.... " 88 CONG.
REc. 731 (1942) (remarks of Rep. Folger).
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lished between the times of condemnation and trial, and whatever
projections may be reliably made with regard to that specific piece of
land.
Since the section 1378 right expires three years after the date of
condemnation, 8 and condemnation suits frequently must wait some
time before trial," a farmer who intended to exercise his right to
transfer the allotment would probably have already done so before the
trial began, as was true in the principal case. In the interest of achiev-
ing a fair valuation of the right under these circumstances, perhaps
trial should be postponed until the owner has exercised his right, re-
nounced it, or allowed it to lapse. No special hardship to either govern-
ment or landowner will result; the government is required by statute to
pay into court its estimate of fair compensation at the time it files the
declaration of taking.2" This payment is available to the owner as
immediate cash to undertake the purchase of new land on which to
exercise his 1378 right, and the final award can be postponed and
adjusted pursuant to facts in existence at the time of trial.2 '
The best solution to the problem raised by the section 1378 right is,
in the opinion of one authority, its revocation by Congress and can-
cellation of the attached allotment whenever a tract is condemned.22
All problems of proof of value of the right would be eliminated, and
the owner would receive the enhanced value of his farm in money as
full compensation. While this approach may offer the soundest long-
term solution, in view of abuses in the exercise of the right,23 it is
See note 1 supra.
"Of the land condemnation cases pending in the district courts in 1961, 33.8%
(994 out of 2939) were three or more years old. 1961 ADMIN. OFFICE UNITED STATES
COURTS ANN. REP. 168. The corresponding figure in 1963 was 27.5% (810 out of 2942).
1963 ADMIN. OFFICE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 217.
The preliminary memorandum in the principal case, 222 F. Supp. 173, was not
filed until October 9, 1963, over three years after the date of condemnation
(July 1, 1959).
46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1965).
"If the judgment ultimately awarded is greater than the amount deposited, the
owner recovers the excess. 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1965). If the
award is less than the amount deposited, the government may be granted judgment
for the difference, even though there is no provision for this eventuality in the
statute. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381 (1943).
Since there is a possibility that the right may, as exercised, have been more
valuable than the enhancement to the original tract by virtue of the allotment attached
to it (see note 12 supra), there is a question whether the deduction from the award
for the value of the section 1378 right should be limited to the enhancement on the
original tract.
' Westfall, supra note 10, at 1197.
"Billie Sol Estes' empire rested in part upon the fraudulent manipulations of
allotments through arrangements with farmers who had section 1378 rights. See
DUSCHA, TAXPAYERS' HAYRIDE 145-81 (1964). See also Morrow v. Clayton, 326
F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Kephart v. Wilson, 219 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
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submitted that the theory adopted by the court in the principal case,
supplemented by the retrospective valuation formula suggested herein,
will be adequate as long as the section 1378 right remains an element
in condemnation proceedings.
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CONSUMER SALES
CONTRACTS-A DEFENSE TO ACTIONS AT LAW,
AND UNDER THE UCC
Plaintiff, operator of a retail furniture store, sold a five hundred
dollar stereo set on installment contract to defendant Williams, know-
ing that defendant supported herself and seven children on a two
hundred eighteen dollar monthly welfare payment.' At the time de-
fendant bought the set, she owed plaintiff one hundred sixty four
dollars on thirteen prior purchases.2 The form contract provided that
plaintiff would retain title to all items purchased until the purchaser
had paid all amounts due in full, and that the debt on each item was
secured by the right to repossess all items purchased.' When defendant
defaulted shortly after purchasing the stereo, plaintiff sued to replevy
all items purchased by her since 1957. The trial court granted judg-
ment for plaintiff, rejecting defendant's contention that the contract
was not enforceable because unconscionable. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, and remanded for the taking of evidence
1 The name of defendant's social worker and the amount of her monthly stipend
were written on the back of the contract.
- Since December 1957, defendant had purchased thirteen items for a total of $1800.
'The contract set out the value of the item and purported to lease it to the
purchaser for a monthly rental payment. However, title was to pass to the purchaser
when the total of the payments made equalled the stated value. The contract further
provided that:
the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser]
to the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of and not in
addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made by [purchaser]
under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter
made by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata of all outstanding leases, bills
and accounts due the Company by [purchaser] at the time each such payment
is made.
The court analyzed the provision as follows, 350 F.2d at 447:
The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance due on every
item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was
liquidated. As a result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item
was secured by the right to repossess all the items previously purchased by
the same purchaser, and each new item mrchased automatically became subjeci
to a security interest arising out of the previous dealings.
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